The notion of'banker's trust' has a paradoxical quality, like 'bur cold' or 'military intelligence.' Common sense (another paradox notion) tells us that bankers have no trust. Perhaps this explains appeal of Marxist and Weberian assumptions that capitalist econo tend to destroy pre-capitalist social formations based on trust. From classic perspective, 'primordial' social ties mandate relations of t (or something like them) in kin groups and castes only so long a members of these groups do not operate directly-as bank do-within a capitalist economic system.
The classic view is reinforced by recent influential studie indigenous Indian commerce during the colonial period. Accordin historians such as Christopher Bayly (1981 Bayly ( , 1983 and David Washbrook (1975 Washbrook ( , 1976 , powerful merchants traded goods and credit within complex networks that transcended ties of kinship and elevated ties of class over ties of caste. The implication, again, is that caste and kinship played little or no role in the emerging capitalist economy of colonial India.
Yet ties of caste and kinship can make substantial contributions t capitalist's enterprise. And trust is an essential ingredient for maki loans or deposits, regardless of whether a banker and client maintai primordial or a contractual relationship. The present paper sugg Acknowledgement. This paper is dedicated to the memory of S. M. L. Laksm Chettiar (Somalay) , who died in November 1986. Somalay was a prolific write editor whose work covered too many topics to enumerate. His knowledge of the p of Tamil Nadu and especially the Nattukottai Chettiars was vast. His help in research on which this paper is based is beyond value. The notion of'banker's trust' has a paradoxical quality, like 'bur cold' or 'military intelligence.' Common sense (another paradox notion) tells us that bankers have no trust. Perhaps this explains appeal of Marxist and Weberian assumptions that capitalist econo tend to destroy pre-capitalist social formations based on trust. From classic perspective, 'primordial' social ties mandate relations of t (or something like them) in kin groups and castes only so long a members of these groups do not operate directly-as bank do-within a capitalist economic system.
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The better-off peasant pays the interest he slightly higher interest paid him by the f receives a fee for his assistance in the transaction on the occasion of the initial bank loan at no risk to himself. Money is plentiful. Only the interest is repaid, never the principal. Everybody is happy.
Irrationality enters the picture when Margayya steps beyond the role of broker and begins to loan money that he himself has borrowed or received on deposit. By loaning money on outrageously large margins, Margayya plants the seeds of his own downfall. For he has neither the reserves of the cooperative bank, nor any guarantee of government intervention in a crisis. As the book reaches its climax, Margayya's clients start a run on his moneylending operation and he is forced into insolvency. Mystical, befuddled, and irrational, Margayya never comprehends the potential for disaster until it is too late.
A second and even more prevalent stereotype portrays Indian moneylenders as all too rational: coldly preying upon their cultivator that, in at least one notable case, even merchant-bankers whose businesses cross-cut caste boundaries relied on caste and kin organization for a significant proportion of their credit needs. In the following discussion, I argue that varieties of financial instruments, patterns of inter-firm deposits, and even systems of accounting categories all revolved around the social organization of their caste. In my conclusion, I suggest that this organization was structured, in turn, by a distinctive set of beliefs about trust and reciprocity.
Three Stereotypes of the Indian Moneylender
Complicating any effort to study indigenous Indian systems of banking and commerce are three stereotypes about Indian moneylenders and their relationships with agricultural producers. One of these stereotypes is illustrated by the wonderfully evocative descriptions in R. K. Narayan's The Financial Expert; a novel about a twentieth-century moneylender who guides his actions more with an eye to the goddess Lakshmi than to any consideration of 'economic rationality.' Margayya, the moneylender of Malgudi, begins his business life by assisting peasants in dealing with the town's Central Cooperative Land
Mortgage Bank. He collects some fees for this service. But, more importantly, he actively creates money for his clients. If a peasant requires a loan for marriage expenses, Margayya persuades a better-off peasant to borrow money from the bank and loan it to the first peasant.
The better-off peasant pays the interest he owes the bank from the slightly higher interest paid him by the first peasant. Margayya receives a fee for his assistance in the transaction on the occasion of the initial bank loan at no risk to himself. Money is plentiful. Only the interest is repaid, never the principal. Everybody is happy. Irrationality enters the picture when Margayya steps beyond the role of broker and begins to loan money that he himself has borrowed or received on deposit. By loaning money on outrageously large margins, Margayya plants the seeds of his own downfall. For he has neither the reserves of the cooperative bank, nor any guarantee of government intervention in a crisis. As the book reaches its climax, Margayya's clients start a run on his moneylending operation and he is forced into insolvency. Mystical, befuddled, and irrational, Margayya never comprehends the potential for disaster until it is too late.
The better-off peasant pays the interest he owes the bank from the slightly higher interest paid him by the first peasant. Margayya receives a fee for his assistance in the transaction on the occasion of the initial bank loan at no risk to himself. Money is plentiful. Only the interest is repaid, never the principal. Everybody is happy. Irrationality enters the picture when Margayya steps beyond the clients, luring them further and further into debt, and final them dry of surplus, savings, property, and liberty.
ethnographic depiction of the usurious moneylender may be f Darling's (I 947) account of Punjabi peasantry. A literary illust the stereotype is provided by Raja Rao's Gandhian indict village moneylenders in the novel, Kantapura.' In this stereoty peasant cultivators who take over the burden of 'irrational moneylenders emerge as rational but immoral.
Some of the excesses in these stereotypes have been address last few years by Barry who explores th rationality and morality that actually characterizes intera tween moneylenders and peasant farmers. Unfortunately, eve welcome corrective essay perpetuates one further stereotype:
of the moneylender as an independent, strictly small-sca preneur whose business activities are confined to credit tr with his client agriculturalists. Thus, even though Michie me ability of moneylenders to manipulate links between villages market networks (I978: 50), he pays no attention to the organization these links presuppose. His focus is tightly confi moneylender/cultivator relationship defined by an exchang and repayments. His primary concern is the organization tion. Missing from Michie's account is any description of networks and moneylender/moneylender relationships d exchanges of deposits, letters of credit, bills of exchange, financial instruments. In other words, he does not address the organization of finance and trade. By default, Michie assigns moneylenders to a small-scale operation limited by the assets they can generate from their cultivator clients.
Legal Stereotypes and Historical Myopia
It is this final stereotype that invariably colors the writing of colonial administrators, economist writing during the colonial period, and historians writing today. In general-to the extent that Indian credit operations are recognized at all-Indian moneylenders are taken as unreliable and irrational, or rational to the point of usurious
For contemporary enthnographic accounts of capitalist exploitation of peasant farmers by moneylenders see Breman 1974; Gough I981; J. Harriss 1982; clients, luring them further and further into debt, and finally sucking them dry of surplus, savings, property, and liberty. A classic ethnographic depiction of the usurious moneylender may be found in Darling's (I 947) account of Punjabi peasantry. A literary illustration of the stereotype is provided by Raja Rao's Gandhian indictment of village moneylenders in the novel, Kantapura.' In this stereotype, it is peasant cultivators who take over the burden of 'irrationality,' while moneylenders emerge as rational but immoral.
Some of the excesses in these stereotypes have been addressed in the last few years by Barry who explores the blend of rationality and morality that actually characterizes interaction between moneylenders and peasant farmers. Unfortunately, even such a welcome corrective essay perpetuates one further stereotype: the image of the moneylender as an independent, strictly small-scale entrepreneur whose business activities are confined to credit transactions with his client agriculturalists. Thus, even though Michie mentions the ability of moneylenders to manipulate links between villages and wider market networks (I978: 50), he pays no attention to the kinds of organization these links presuppose. His focus is tightly confined to the moneylender/cultivator relationship defined by an exchange of loans and repayments. His primary concern is the organization of production. Missing from Michie's account is any description of market networks and moneylender/moneylender relationships defined by exchanges of deposits, letters of credit, bills of exchange, and other financial instruments. In other words, he does not address the organization of finance and trade. By default, Michie assigns moneylenders to a small-scale operation limited by the assets they can generate from their cultivator clients.
For contemporary enthnographic accounts of capitalist exploitation of peasant farmers by moneylenders see Breman 1974; Gough I981; J. Harriss 1982; immorality, but in any case as strictly small-sc assets and the scope of their credit extension ac is easy to find reports devoting large amount distinguish between petty moneylenders on the the Indian stereotype) and large-scale bankers o of Western banks.
Reflecting this distinction, the legal history of the period is replete with judicial efforts to define indigenous financial instruments such as hundis (a kind of bill of exchange used by moneylenders but not 'true bankers!'). Ultimately, the courts concluded that such instruments were not unconditionally negotiable and hence fell outside colonial legislation and case law regarding financial instruments. Accordingly, disputes concerning transactions involving hundis were not easily brought before a court of law (Krishnan I959; . The implication of such a finding is that instruments such as hundis, which lack legal standing, could not possibly function effectively outside of a specific local community's ability to apply customary sanctions and that, therefore, hundis must be ineffective instruments for any kind of large-scale or long-distance trade.
Such a conclusion might be appropriate for ajurist or administrator who looks only to the courts for sanctions on contracts or authoritative judgement of disputes. On the other hand it is certainly inappropriate for any actor dealing with the day-to-day operation of Indian commercial enterprise. The difficulty is that it simply ignores customary sanctions on hundi transactions that are rigorously enforced by multi-locale, multi-regional, and even multi-national communities of businessmen. Indeed, the considerable negotiability established by hundis is a testament to the adequacy of these customary sanctions (see below). When the jurist's failure to appreciate these important financial instruments is placed in the context of stereotypic views about Indian bankers as merely clever (and sometimes irrational or usurious) moneylenders, it is clear that British and British-trained jurists never really comprehended the systematic operation of Indian financial institutions. Stereotypes of the Indian moneylender even affect scholars who explicitly recognize indigneous systems of trade and banking during the colonial period. , for example, cites the monopolistic access of British entrepreneurs to 'organized' banking systems as one of their important advantages in pre-empting Indian investment from industrial opportunities well into the twentieth century. Apparently, Bagchi has in mind characterizations of the Indian immorality, but in any case as strictly small-scale in the size of their assets and the scope of their credit extension activities. For example, it is easy to find reports devoting large amounts of space in efforts to distinguish between petty moneylenders on the one hand (representing the Indian stereotype) and large-scale bankers operating in the fashion of Western banks.
Such a conclusion might be appropriate for ajurist or administrator who looks only to the courts for sanctions on contracts or authoritative judgement of disputes. On the other hand it is certainly inappropriate for any actor dealing with the day-to-day operation of Indian commercial enterprise. The difficulty is that it simply ignores customary sanctions on hundi transactions that are rigorously enforced by multi-locale, multi-regional, and even multi-national communities of businessmen. Indeed, the considerable negotiability established by hundis is a testament to the adequacy of these customary sanctions (see below). When the jurist's failure to appreciate these important financial instruments is placed in the context of stereotypic views about Indian bankers as merely clever (and sometimes irrational or usurious) moneylenders, it is clear that British and British-trained jurists never really comprehended the systematic operation of Indian financial institutions. Stereotypes of the Indian moneylender even affect scholars who explicitly recognize indigneous systems of trade and banking during the colonial period. , for example, cites the monopolistic access of British entrepreneurs to 'organized' banking systems as one of their important advantages in pre-empting Indian investment from industrial opportunities well into the twentieth century. Apparently, Bagchi has in mind characterizations of the Indian banking system in which Presidency and British exc compared along with the developing, Indian joint sto early twentieth century; the former making credit British, the latter to Indians. An Western colonial views that India lacked an institutional system capable of providing the large-scale finance necessary for industrial investment.5 Lacking in all such views of Indian credit resources is any appreciation for the complex network of financial debts, opportunities, and possibilities that indigenous moneylenders and bankers could activate outside of Western-style banks through relationships of kinship and caste or through common participation with potential investors and lenders in a variety of 'public,'-religious and secular institutions. Under the circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that the scale and scope of Indian financial operations have been denied when the very mechanisms for their transaction have gone unrecognized.
What are we to make of colonial administrators who regularly denied the existence of large-scale Indian commerce while interacting with its institutions on a daily basis? How are we to account for the strange myopia of British administrators and the historians who study them?
On one hand, I suspect that verbal denial constituted a device by British banking interests for attaining special treatment from the emerging government-regulated banking systems in South and Southeast Asia (e.g., Crawfurd 197I (1837); Buchanan I870). On the 4 MPBEC vol. I, 1930: ioi-i8 (evidence of the Nattukottai Nagarathars' Association and of C. A. C. Kasinathan Chettiar; quoted in Bagchi 1972: 207. 5 In fact, Bagchi's argument stresses the collusive cooperation between British economic interests and colonial political authorities. But within this argument, he accepts the colonial vision of India's financial underdevelopment. The actual availability of credit to Indian entrepreneurs actually underscores his primary argument about British monopolization of opportunities for industrial investment (see also Ray 1979 Western colonial views that India lacked an institutional system capable of providing the large-scale finance necessary for industrial investment.5 Lacking in all such views of Indian credit resources is any appreciation for the complex network of financial debts, opportunities, and possibilities that indigenous moneylenders and bankers could activate outside of Western-style banks through relationships of kinship and caste or through common participation with potential investors and lenders in a variety of 'public,'-religious and secular institutions. Under the circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that the scale and scope of Indian financial operations have been denied when the very mechanisms for their transaction have gone unrecognized.
On one hand, I suspect that verbal denial constituted a device by British banking interests for attaining special treatment from the emerging government-regulated banking systems in South and Southeast Asia (e.g., Crawfurd 197I (1837); Buchanan I870). On the 4 MPBEC vol. I, 1930: ioi-i8 (evidence of the Nattukottai Nagarathars' Association and of C. A. C. Kasinathan Chettiar; quoted in Bagchi 1972: 207. 5 In fact, Bagchi's argument stresses the collusive cooperation between British economic interests and colonial political authorities. But within this argument, he accepts the colonial vision of India's financial underdevelopment. The actual availability of credit to Indian entrepreneurs actually underscores his primary argument about British monopolization of opportunities for industrial investment (see also Ray 1979) . other hand, anti-colonial historians may give too much credit made by colonial administrators in pronouncements on com policy while failing to consider the massive capital contro invested by Indian financiers. But these provocative asser themes for another essay. The present paper attempts to m existing stereotypes (whatever their basis) by examining a large-scale system for credit provision-a non-Western b system-operated by a South Indian caste during the coloni The Nattukottai Chettiars
The Nattukottai Chettiars were the chief merchant-banking caste colonial South India.6 They do not appear in the Western historica record until the beginning of the nineteenth century. But Chettiar o tradition and indigenous documents maintained in the temples o Tamil Nadu extend our knowledge about their past back to th seventeenth century (Rudner I987) . At that time, they were primarily small-scale, itinerant salt traders in the interior of present-day Tamil Nadu. By the eighteenth century, some individuals had extended their business operations as far South as the pearl, rice, cloth and arrac trade of Ceylon, others as far north as the rice and wheat trade i Calcutta. They were also involved in monelending and other credi extending operations. By the nineteenth and early twentieth centurie especially after the opening of the Suez canal, Chettiars had become t 6 There are between 50 and Ioo castes in South India who take the name Chetti o Chettiar. Many of these castes share a common motif in their adherence to origin myt of migration from the ancient Tamil port city of Kaveripumpatinam. Due in part their common name and in part to this shared motif, all Chetti castes are frequent spoken of as descendants of an original caste of merchants dwelling in Kaveripumpa nam. In fact, it is more accurate to view the term simply as an occupational title of adopted by castes only recently specializing in trade or moneylending. Thus Bal Chetties, for example, are actually a caste which fissioned off from the Balija Nay ('Warrior') caste as recently as the nineteenth century. Accordingly, they have clo kinship ties to these Nayak 'warriors' than to Chetti merchants. Other Chetti castes ar clustered together in macro-groupings such as the 23 Telugu Ariya Vaishya Chetti (the Ariyan Vaishyas) which contain the well-known Komati Chetti group, or the Tamil Aiyira Vaishya Chetties (the Thousand Gotra Vaishyas) which contain t Kasu Karar Chettis. The Nattukottai Chettiars or, as they call themselves, th Nakarattars, belong to neither of these groupings, claiming instead an independen genetic status. Indeed, the distinctive scale and organization of their commerc activities reflects a greater functional similarity with South India's other major bankin caste, the Kalladaikurichi Brahmins, than it does with any other Chetti caste. Unle otherwise indicated in this essay, my use of the name 'Chettiar' without furth qualification refers only to Nattukottai Chettiars.
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other hand, anti-colonial historians may give too much credit made by colonial administrators in pronouncements on com policy while failing to consider the massive capital contro invested by Indian financiers. But these provocative asser themes for another essay. The present paper attempts to m existing stereotypes (whatever their basis) by examining a large-scale system for credit provision-a non-Western b system-operated by a South Indian caste during the coloni The Nattukottai Chettiars
The Nattukottai Chettiars were the chief merchant-banking caste colonial South India.6 They do not appear in the Western historica record until the beginning of the nineteenth century. But Chettiar o tradition and indigenous documents maintained in the temples o Tamil Nadu extend our knowledge about their past back to th seventeenth century (Rudner I987) . At that time, they were primarily small-scale, itinerant salt traders in the interior of present-day Tamil Nadu. By the eighteenth century, some individuals had extended their business operations as far South as the pearl, rice, cloth and arrac trade of Ceylon, others as far north as the rice and wheat trade i Calcutta. They were also involved in monelending and other credi extending operations. By the nineteenth and early twentieth centurie especially after the opening of the Suez canal, Chettiars had become t 6 There are between 50 and Ioo castes in South India who take the name Chetti o Chettiar. Many of these castes share a common motif in their adherence to origin myt of migration from the ancient Tamil port city of Kaveripumpatinam. Due in part their common name and in part to this shared motif, all Chetti castes are frequent spoken of as descendants of an original caste of merchants dwelling in Kaveripumpa nam. In fact, it is more accurate to view the term simply as an occupational title of adopted by castes only recently specializing in trade or moneylending. Thus Bal Chetties, for example, are actually a caste which fissioned off from the Balija Nay ('Warrior') caste as recently as the nineteenth century. Accordingly, they have clo kinship ties to these Nayak 'warriors' than to Chetti merchants. Chandrasekhar 1980; Masters 1957; Moreno 1982; Nadarajan 1966; Naidu I Chandrasekhar 1980; Masters 1957; Moreno 1982; Nadarajan 1966; Naidu I Of the various estimates of Chettiar capital, those pro Savaranatha Pillai (MPBEC 1930) are particularly interes of the qualifications that he attaches to them (see Figure 2 the Assistant Commissioner for Income Tax for Madras were prepared from tax returns compiled by tax officers fo which Chettiars had their principal place of business.8 quence, they are unlikely to reflect any additional bias distortions built into procedures for recording Chettiar in Pillai describes the kinds of distortions these are likely t First, the information they contain is derived from faulty s of Chettiar assets in Madras. Pillai Of the various estimates of Chettiar capital, those pro Savaranatha Pillai (MPBEC 1930) are particularly interes of the qualifications that he attaches to them (see Figure 2 the Assistant Commissioner for Income Tax for Madras were prepared from tax returns compiled by tax officers fo which Chettiars had their principal place of business.8 quence, they are unlikely to reflect any additional bias distortions built into procedures for recording Chettiar in Pillai describes the kinds of distortions these are likely t First, the information they contain is derived from faulty s of Chettiar assets in Madras. Pillai difficulties in arriving at an accurate estimate of Chettiar reflected by the multiple and inconsistent estimates of ranging from Rs 536,000,000 to Rs 1,300,000,000 contained reports of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees Burma, and Ceylon. In the depressed economic environm time and in the atmosphere of emergent nationalism a politics that characterized public debate in the I930s, m evidence obtained in public enquiry on any topic was highly prejudicial. Enquiries into moneylending and banking, indebtedness, and commercial or industrial finance were no On one hand, the vast majority of relevant testimony w from Chettiar debtors who painted a predictably black pict creditors. On the other hand, testimony by Chettiar banker be accepted as an unbiased alternative. Such as it is, howeve evidence provides the only picture we have of the ext business operations. I present sample estimates of Chett capital and assets in Figures I and 2 .
Of the various estimates of Chettiar capital, those pro Savaranatha Pillai (MPBEC 1930) are particularly interes of the qualifications that he attaches to them (see Figure 2 the Assistant Commissioner for Income Tax for Madras were prepared from tax returns compiled by tax officers fo which Chettiars had their principal place of business.8 quence, they are unlikely to reflect any additional bias distortions built into procedures for recording Chettiar in Pillai describes the kinds of distortions these are likely t First, the information they contain is derived from faulty s of Chettiar assets in Madras. Pillai cancel each other out in any aggregate analysis-a point that is frequently overlooked. As a result, many analysts apparently take
Pillai's phrase about the ratio of'own to borrowed capital' (reproduced in Figure 2 ) and similar characterizations of their own business b
Chettiars as applying to individual firms or agencies in a locale rather than applying to their aggregation.
The Banking System
The Chettiars built their commercial empire out of a complex network of interdependent family business firms. Each firm was individually involved in commodities trading, moneylending, domestic and over seas banking operations, or industrial investment. Beyond this making possible every other commercial venture in which it engagedeach family firm operated as a commercial bank: taking money on deposit and drafting bills and other financial instruments for use in the transfer of loanable capital to branch offices and to other banks. As a result, every Chettiar firm was tied together with all of the others to form a unified banking system. This is not to say that their banking system resembled an economist's model of Western-style banking systems. In the Chettiar system banking firms and other communal institutions, as well, were all tied together by relationships of territory, descent, marriage, and common cult membership . In other words, the Chettiar banking system was a caste-based banking system. Nevertheless Chettiar and
Western-style banking systems shared two fundamental properties: (i) they maintained networks of individual banks which directly or indirectly invested and deposited funds in one another; (2) these networks supported special institutions for accumulating and distri capital even inaccurately. By Pillai's estimate, they left out the capital of at least I,6oo Chettiars whose principal business was located in Burma and 193 Chettiars, whose business lay in Madras but outside the areas reported in Figure 2 (MPBEC I930: II72). Consequently Pillai's subordinates were able to provide only undocumented estimates of these assets. Finally-and this is a major point of misinter pretation that Pillai did not mention but which will concern u below-the division between the Chettiar's 'own capital' and 'bor rowed capital' refers to aggregate measures of all Chettiar capital in each specific locale, not individual loans and deposits among th
Chettiar firms within locales. Such inter-firm transactions would cancel each other out in any aggregate analysis-a point that is frequently overlooked. As a result, many analysts apparently take
Western-style banking systems shared two fundamental properties: (i) they maintained networks of individual banks which directly or indirectly invested and deposited funds in one another; (2) these networks supported special institutions for accumulating and distri buting reserves of capital that affected rates of interest, and the c supply of credit and money. The structure of Chettiar fina institutions lies beyond the scope of the present paper.9 Instead, on the financial transactions and the financial instruments that were transacted.
As indicated, Chettiars were active in trade and industry as well as banking. But, after the I85os, when British exchange banks first began to move into the European credit market in India, and until the onset of the world-wide depression, Chettiar business increasingly emphasized various forms of financial intermediation at the expense of commodities trading. Moreover, industrial investment entered their portfolios in a serious way only after the I920o and I930s. One of the major factors contributing to their emphasis on banking operations during the late nineteenth century was the short-term funds made available to them by the establishment of British exchange banks.'? Their success in utilizing these funds, however, was due to their system of interbank deposits.
During the period under consideration, the new British exchange banks were faced with the problem of investing the considerable funds on short-term deposit with them from their British clients. Although they would not risk these funds by loaning money to most native Asians, British bankers did make short-term loans to large, established Indian firms. Among their clients were reputable Chettiar bankers, whose loans were secured only by the co-signature of a second Chettiar. Chettiars, in turn, loaned money they borrowed from the British to less credit-worthy Asians at a higher rate. This is not to say that the British banks provided unlimited credit to every Chettiar. On the contrary, they attempted to build safeguards into their Chettiar loan operations by excluding small Chettiar firms from consideration. Loans would be made only if the recipient or co-signatory were on an approved 'adathi' list prepared by the head office of the Imperial Bank of India. The list was supposed to keep track of Chettiar credit-worthiness and indicate the maximum amount of loans for which individuals were elegible. " But the safeguards never really worked, and their short-comings are revealing of Chettiar organizational interdependence. As one exper the Ceylon Banking Commission,12
As the due dates of the loans vary in the differen borrow from one bank to pay off their dues to o which is financially embarrassed can easily tide ov actually insolvent the heaviest loss is entailed upo is repayable last in order of time.
... the system of inter-Chetty lending was successful working of Chettiar Banking. When in freely among themselves, at the usual inter-Chett if the rate charged by the banks, whichever accommodate a brother in the trade, a Chettiar h Thus so long as some among the Chettiars had un the banks, none of them, whose position was oth it to be such to his prospective Chetty creditor, ha any inability to meet his short term obligation t Thus the Chettiars through the age-old practice lenders of last resort, were able to use loans from same bank, to meet the maturing bank loans. To was the banks' own money which enabled the contracts with the banks with striking promptn
The implication is that Chettiars not only fi loans from their own short-term borrowings, and even long-term loans as well. If their cli their own short-term borrowings came due client, Chettiars could nevertheless repay th borrowing from a fellow Chettiar. The secon have borrowed from the very bank being re required on the short-term loans that Chetti banks, and since Chettiars found it easy t limits that British banks placed on loans to constraint on Chettiar borrowing was their o face of the highly expansive, late nineteenth there was little need to exercise caution.
12 Evidence of J. Tyagarajah (head 'shroff' for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) CBCR 2: 353-4. In Ceylon, the British banks engaged shroffs (normally from one of the non-Nattukottai Chettiar Chetti castes of Colombo) to recommend and guarantee loans made to local bank clients. This occupation depended on their knowledge of potential borrowers (Wright 1907 : 317, cited in Weersooria 1973 . The term 'shroff has broad currency all over India. It is, in fact, a cognate form of 'Chetti' and is used in North India much the same way that 'Chetti' is used in South India. organizational interdependence. As one expert witness testified before the Ceylon Banking Commission,12
As the due dates of the loans vary in the different banks, the Chettiars used to borrow from one bank to pay off their dues to others so that a Chettiar firm which is financially embarrassed can easily tide over its difficulties and if it is actually insolvent the heaviest loss is entailed upon the bank to which the loan is repayable last in order of time.
... the system of inter-Chetty lending was the chief support of the successful working of Chettiar Banking. When in need of liquid funds they lent freely among themselves, at the usual inter-Chetty rate (6 per cent or under) or if the rate charged by the banks, whichever was higher, if, in order to accommodate a brother in the trade, a Chettiar had to borrow from a bank. Thus so long as some among the Chettiars had untapped margins of credit at the banks, none of them, whose position was otherwise sound and could prove it to be such to his prospective Chetty creditor, had to fear, in all normal times, any inability to meet his short term obligation to his bank.
Thus the Chettiars through the age-old practice of being their own mutual lenders of last resort, were able to use loans from banks, sometimes from the same bank, to meet the maturing bank loans. To the extent this happened, it was the banks' own money which enabled the Chettiars to keep their loan contracts with the banks with striking promptness.
The implication is that Chettiars not only financed secure short-term loans from their own short-term borrowings, but risky short-term loans and even long-term loans as well. If their clients could not repay or if their own short-term borrowings came due before the repayment by a client, Chettiars could nevertheless repay the British banks simply by borrowing from a fellow Chettiar. The second Chettiar, in turn, might have borrowed from the very bank being repaid! Since no security was required on the short-term loans that Chettiars borrowed from British banks, and since Chettiars found it easy to circumvent the kinds of limits that British banks placed on loans to them, virtually the only constraint on Chettiar borrowing was their own sense of caution. In the face of the highly expansive, late nineteenth-century world economy, there was little need to exercise caution.
12 Evidence of J. Tyagarajah (head 'shroff' for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) CBCR 2: 353-4. In Ceylon, the British banks engaged shroffs (normally from one of the non-Nattukottai Chettiar Chetti castes of Colombo) to recommend and guarantee loans made to local bank clients. This occupation depended on their knowledge of potential borrowers (Wright 1907 : 317, cited in Weersooria 1973 . The term 'shroff has broad currency all over India. It is, in fact, a cognate form of 'Chetti' and is used in North India much the same way that 'Chetti' is used in South India.
The Great Depression and the Limits of Trust
The entire system was based on the mutual trust of creditors borrowers and the trust was largely justified. No Chettiar stoo himself. Behind him lay the resources of his entire communit Nevertheless, there were limits, even to Chettiar resources, and the limits were reached during the onset of the world depression. Chet loans to Asian cultivators, plantation owners, and commodity tra had once seemed safe and profitable investments on the bas projections about expanding world markets. But as prices agricultural commodities began to fall, projected profits rapidly tu into real losses. Unable to cover their production costs, Chettiar cli could not repay their loans, and Chettiars (increasingly faced by th own credit difficulties) refused to grant extensions. The Great Depression and the Limits of Trust
The entire system was based on the mutual trust of creditors borrowers and the trust was largely justified. No Chettiar stoo himself. Behind him lay the resources of his entire communit Nevertheless, there were limits, even to Chettiar resources, and the limits were reached during the onset of the world depression. Chet loans to Asian cultivators, plantation owners, and commodity tra had once seemed safe and profitable investments on the bas projections about expanding world markets. But as prices agricultural commodities began to fall, projected profits rapidly tu into real losses. Unable to cover their production costs, Chettiar cli could not repay their loans, and Chettiars (increasingly faced by th own credit difficulties) refused to grant extensions. Where no o solution was possible, Chettiars took possession of lands or move property with which their clients had secured their loans. In Ceylo this entailed foreclosing or taking possession of property wor approximately Rs 25 million and accepting a loss on an equal amoun unsecured loans (CBCR I 1934: 42) . In Burma, Chettiars wound owning title to roughly one-third of the best rice-producing land ( I974b; . Ultimately, such actio stimulated regional and national Southeast Asian resentment of Tamil moneylenders and led to a series of legislative acts and proceedings that drove the Chettiars out of Ceylon and Burma, reduced their Southeast Asian empire to Malaya and Indo-China long before this point had been reached, the system of mutual t among Chettiars and non-Chettiars had been irrevocably undermine The impact of the depression on Chettiar social organization beyond the scope of the present paper. But events that marked its o illustrate the power and effectiveness of Chettiar commercial pract during the height of the preceding period of expansion. The failur the A.R.A.R.S.M. firm in Colombo during the so-called 'Chetty C of 1925 is particularly telling.'3 In the firm's bankruptcy hearings, High Court of Madras estimated its Indian assets at Rs 800,000
Indian liabilities at Rs 3,700,000; its Ceylon assets at Rs 150,000 and Ceylon liabilities at Rs 1,700,000. According to the Ceylon Bank Commission (CBCR 1934 II: 253: The discovery of the questionable practices of the firm of A.R. A.R.S.M. led [British] banks to look upon those practices as not particular to that individual firm but as possible types which could be and might be adopted by other firms of Chettiars in the island. Accordingly, the banks decided to revise the securities on which they had been doing business with the Chettiars until then and they found to their dismay that many of the securities offered to them by the Chettiars were not safe and others were neither sufficient or adequate.
The disingenuous British statement of 'sudden discovery' served them as a rationale for suspending further credit and for calling in all outstanding loans to Chettiar bankers in Ceylon; a decision worth 25 million rupees to Chettiar working capital. No evidence is available to me that suggests any alternative explanation for this change in British bank lending policy. But it is hardly credible that the British banks would loan out such a large sum without some idea about the security of the loans. In any case, the British loss of trust and their abrupt cessation of all loans to Chettiars required the Chettiars, in turn, to call in their loans to Ceylonese clients. The result of both actions, as reported by the Colombo Chettiar association, was a decline in their business volume from 150 million rupees to I00 million rupees between 1929 and 1934 ).
Chettiar Interest Rates and Deposit Banking
My purpose in reviewing this chapter of Asian history is to highlight Chettiar efficiency in taking advantage of their special relationship with British banks before the depression, not to consider their inability to cope with the world-wide economic collapse. Accordingly, I turn now to an examination of some of the financial transactions in which Chettiars engaged in pre-depression years, especially among one another, and to the social relations that their financial transactions created. Chettiars took two primary considerations into account when they made a financial transaction: (I) the nature of the social relationship established by the transaction and (2) the conditions under which the principal amount of the transaction need be returned to the creditor.
On this dual basis Chettiar bankers distinguished four basic kinds of deposits.
Chettiar bankers accepted two kinds of current deposits or kadai kanakku ('shop' accounts). These comprised demand deposits and a uniquely Chettiar transaction called a nadappu or 'walking' deposit The discovery of the questionable practices of the firm of A.R. A.R.S.M. led [British] banks to look upon those practices as not particular to that individual firm but as possible types which could be and might be adopted by other firms of Chettiars in the island. Accordingly, the banks decided to revise the securities on which they had been doing business with the Chettiars until then and they found to their dismay that many of the securities offered to them by the Chettiars were not safe and others were neither sufficient or adequate.
Chettiar bankers accepted two kinds of current deposits or kadai kanakku ('shop' accounts). These comprised demand deposits and a uniquely Chettiar transaction called a nadappu or 'walking' deposit (discussed below). Chettiar also accepted fixed term (two, three month) deposits from fellow Chettiars called thavanai kanakku accounts), and fixed term deposits from non-Chettiars called va kanakku ('fixed interest' accounts). The interest rate for n deposits served as a benchmark for rates paid on other deposit this respect, was similar to the prime lending rate set by the bank of a modern nation state. In this case, however, the nada represented the interest that Chettiars paid one another fo made to their kadai kanakku accounts. The rate was established on the sixteenth day of every month at meetings of Chettiar bankers in major business centers, notably, Devakottai, Madras, Colombo, Penang, and Rangoon. Kadai kanakku deposits paid simple interest at the nadappu rate calculated for the period during which a deposit was maintained.
By contrast, thavanai deposits paid compound interest adding the appropriate increment to the principal at intervals of two, three, or six months depending on the terms of the deposit. Vayan vatti deposits paid interest at a rate calculated by the addition of a few annas per month over the nadappu rate (I anna = L rupee). But like kadai kanakku deposits, they paid only simple interest.14 These Chettiar interest-setting practices established a staggered system of interest rates with two consequences. First, it allowed bankers to attract relatively cheap nadappu deposits from fellow Chettiars for use in current accounts, subject to unpredictable demand. Second, it also allowed them to attract more expensive, but more predictable fixed term thavanai deposits from fellow Chettiars with no immediate cash flow crisis. In both cases, however, Chettiars assured themselves of access to deposit capital at a cost that was cheaper than the vayan vatti rate paid to non-Chettiars, and far cheaper than the interest charges incurred by borrowing money in secured or unsecured loans (see Appendix). (discussed below). Chettiar also accepted fixed term (two, three month) deposits from fellow Chettiars called thavanai kanakku accounts), and fixed term deposits from non-Chettiars called va kanakku ('fixed interest' accounts). The interest rate for n deposits served as a benchmark for rates paid on other deposit this respect, was similar to the prime lending rate set by the bank of a modern nation state. In this case, however, the nada represented the interest that Chettiars paid one another fo made to their kadai kanakku accounts. The rate was established on the sixteenth day of every month at meetings of Chettiar bankers in major business centers, notably, Devakottai, Madras, Colombo, Penang, and Rangoon. Kadai kanakku deposits paid simple interest at the nadappu rate calculated for the period during which a deposit was maintained.
By contrast, thavanai deposits paid compound interest adding the appropriate increment to the principal at intervals of two, three, or six months depending on the terms of the deposit. Vayan vatti deposits paid interest at a rate calculated by the addition of a few annas per month over the nadappu rate (I anna = L rupee). But like kadai kanakku deposits, they paid only simple interest.14 These Chettiar interest-setting practices established a staggered system of interest rates with two consequences. First, it allowed bankers to attract relatively cheap nadappu deposits from fellow Chettiars for use in current accounts, subject to unpredictable demand. Second, it also allowed them to attract more expensive, but more predictable fixed term thavanai deposits from fellow Chettiars with no immediate cash flow crisis. In both cases, however, Chettiars assured themselves of access to deposit capital at a cost that was cheaper than the vayan vatti rate paid to non-Chettiars, and far cheaper than the interest charges incurred by borrowing money in secured or unsecured loans (see Appendix). passed ... The meeting discusses the general financial situation, and fixes the current [nadappu] rate for the current month with this, taking into account the current pitch and tendency of the thavanai rate, the rates current amongst the Marwaris, Multanis, and Gujeratis [other Indian banking castes] and the rates for advances by thejoint-stock banks to Chettiars. As every firm has both income and expenses determined largely by this rate, great care is taken to fix the rate according to the needs of the situation. But for the first sixteen days of the month before the rate is fixed, there is a general consensus of opinion as to the rate that will be fixed, the weekly adjustment of thavanai rate and the discussions incidental to that adjustment being sufficient guide.
According to this description, the relationship between nadappu and thavanai rates gave mathematical priority to the former in that the simple nadappu rate was taken as the basis for calculating compound interest payments on thavanai deposits. In practice, however, nadappu rates were related to the fluctuating interest paid on thavanai rates; that is, they were fit to interest rates that Chettiars were willing to pay in order to maintain a predictable reserve of capital in the form of thavanai deposits. Prior to the 192os, determining the thavanai rate had, apparently, been a relatively informal affair, subject to competition among Chettiars for deposits. But by 1920, the thavanai rate was fixed in a systematic way every Sunday morning at 9 o'clock by a meeting in Rangoon temple, subject to modification during the week in case that [was] generally desired by the community... It [was] not fixed according to the current [nadappu] rate; in fact the relationship [was] the other way about, the course of the thavanai rate being a consideration when fixing the current rate.
(BPBEC I: 227)
The signficance of this procedure in the present context is the light it casts on the Chettiar understanding of banking. For Chettiars, the primary consideration in setting interest rates was to attract fixed-term, thavanai deposits and thereby maintain a predictable reserve of capital to underwrite the full range of their credit-extending activities. Without this ability, each individual banker would have had to depend on his personal capital to finance moneylending and commodities-trading.
But, by working together in a reliable and systematic way, by setting interest rates, and by ensuring one another inexpensive access to deposit capital, Chettiars were able to draw upon the collective assets of the entire caste. This is not to say that each Chettiar attracted deposits from all Chettiars. The system as a whole was divided into local segments, based on residential and kinship groupings as well as on the location of agency houses. Membership in these different segments was not exclusive and Chettiars maintained cross-cutting ties in various passed ... The meeting discusses the general financial situation, and fixes the current [nadappu] rate for the current month with this, taking into account the current pitch and tendency of the thavanai rate, the rates current amongst the Marwaris, Multanis, and Gujeratis [other Indian banking castes] and the rates for advances by thejoint-stock banks to Chettiars. As every firm has both income and expenses determined largely by this rate, great care is taken to fix the rate according to the needs of the situation. But for the first sixteen days of the month before the rate is fixed, there is a general consensus of opinion as to the rate that will be fixed, the weekly adjustment of thavanai rate and the discussions incidental to that adjustment being sufficient guide.
But, by working together in a reliable and systematic way, by setting interest rates, and by ensuring one another inexpensive access to deposit capital, Chettiars were able to draw upon the collective assets of the entire caste. This is not to say that each Chettiar attracted deposits from all Chettiars. The system as a whole was divided into local segments, The major Chettiar financial instrument for all transactions was the hundi, a kind of bill of exchange or written order for payment that i drawers used much in the way that Americans use checks drawn their checking accounts. In order to draw a hundi, a client had to op up an account and maintain a correspondence relationship with banker. 5 Hundis were sometimes used just to transfer funds from one location to another (a facility employed primarily by Chettiars among themselves) but they were more typically employed in financing trade transactions by Chettiars and non-Chettiars, alike. Tun Wai (I962: 5o), a Burmese banking authority, estimates that before 1930, perhaps 75% of Chettiar hundis in Burma were trade hundis. In such cases, a paddy merchant, for example, bought a shipment of paddy at a local market in Burma with cash that he transferred to the seller by drawing a hundi on his account in a local Chettiar banking office. The Chettiar banker encashed the hundi, receiving a discounting fee of I% to 3%, and took custody of the railroad receipt for the paddy shipment, even though the transaction was not a loan and did not incur rates of interest charged on loans. The banker sent the hundi and the receipt to his firm's main office in Rangoon along with instructions to debit the 15 Deposit accounts were separate from loan accouts which were secured against various kinds of promissory notes or mortgages. Loans, moreover, were paid out in one lump sum and could not be recalled by issuing a hundi. In some cases (typically for loans made to petty shopkeepers in towns and cities) a particular kind of loan called a kandu kisti loan might be advanced. These loans (normally for small amounts, with interest deducted in advance and payments of the principal scheduled over a short period) yielded a high return to the moneylender (25% per annum or more, cf. MPBEC I: 227). However, kandu kisti accounts, like other loan accounts, were not subject to the drawing of hundis. The major Chettiar financial instrument for all transactions was the hundi, a kind of bill of exchange or written order for payment that i drawers used much in the way that Americans use checks drawn their checking accounts. In order to draw a hundi, a client had to op up an account and maintain a correspondence relationship with banker. 5 Hundis were sometimes used just to transfer funds from one location to another (a facility employed primarily by Chettiars among themselves) but they were more typically employed in financing trade transactions by Chettiars and non-Chettiars, alike. Tun Wai (I962: 5o), a Burmese banking authority, estimates that before 1930, perhaps 75% of Chettiar hundis in Burma were trade hundis. In such cases, a paddy merchant, for example, bought a shipment of paddy at a local market in Burma with cash that he transferred to the seller by drawing a hundi on his account in a local Chettiar banking office. The Chettiar banker encashed the hundi, receiving a discounting fee of I% to 3%, and took custody of the railroad receipt for the paddy shipment, even though the transaction was not a loan and did not incur rates of interest charged on loans. The banker sent the hundi and the receipt to his firm's main office in Rangoon along with instructions to debit the 15 Deposit accounts were separate from loan accouts which were secured against various kinds of promissory notes or mortgages. Loans, moreover, were paid out in one lump sum and could not be recalled by issuing a hundi. In some cases (typically for loans made to petty shopkeepers in towns and cities) a particular kind of loan called a kandu kisti loan might be advanced. These loans (normally for small amounts, with interest deducted in advance and payments of the principal scheduled over a short period) yielded a high return to the moneylender (25% per annum or more, cf. MPBEC I: 227). However, kandu kisti accounts, like other loan accounts, were not subject to the drawing of hundis. The major Chettiar financial instrument for all transactions was the hundi, a kind of bill of exchange or written order for payment that i drawers used much in the way that Americans use checks drawn their checking accounts. In order to draw a hundi, a client had to op up an account and maintain a correspondence relationship with banker. 5 Hundis were sometimes used just to transfer funds from one location to another (a facility employed primarily by Chettiars among themselves) but they were more typically employed in financing trade transactions by Chettiars and non-Chettiars, alike. Tun Wai (I962: 5o), a Burmese banking authority, estimates that before 1930, perhaps 75% of Chettiar hundis in Burma were trade hundis. In such cases, a paddy merchant, for example, bought a shipment of paddy at a local market in Burma with cash that he transferred to the seller by drawing a hundi on his account in a local Chettiar banking office. The Chettiar banker encashed the hundi, receiving a discounting fee of I% to 3%, and took custody of the railroad receipt for the paddy shipment, even though the transaction was not a loan and did not incur rates of interest charged on loans. The banker sent the hundi and the receipt to his firm's main office in Rangoon along with instructions to debit the 15 Deposit accounts were separate from loan accouts which were secured against various kinds of promissory notes or mortgages. Loans, moreover, were paid out in one lump sum and could not be recalled by issuing a hundi. In some cases (typically for loans made to petty shopkeepers in towns and cities) a particular kind of loan called a kandu kisti loan might be advanced. These loans (normally for small amounts, with interest deducted in advance and payments of the principal scheduled over a short period) yielded a high return to the moneylender (25% per annum or more, cf. MPBEC I: 227). However, kandu kisti accounts, like other loan accounts, were not subject to the drawing of hundis. merchant's account. If the banker had no off hundi and receipt to another banker (perh adathi) with whom he maintained an accou thus rediscount the hundi with the second extended the service without charging a f order to regain the railway receipt and ta from either banker, the merchant had to with the Rangoon banker in a satisfactory Chettiars made use of four basic hundis: (I) Dharsan hundis or demand drafts (literally, 'sight' hundis) were payable against a kadai kanakku account within a three-day grace period of presentation to a person and at a place specified in the hundi. (2) Nadappu hundis (literally, 'walking' hundis), were also payable against a kadai kanakku account. Nadappu hundis were instruments unique to Chettiars and were neither demand drafts nor fixed period, term drafts but, instead, were discounted at the convenience of the drawee, whose only obligation was to pay interest at the nadappu rate until he chose to encash them.
(3) Thavanai hundis (literally, 'resting' hundis) were payable against thavanai accounts and operated like short-term certificates of deposit.
The banks (the drawees) need not pay on demand until after the specified date, usually 60 to 90 days after the bill was drawn.17 Their term to maturity was called a thavanai, a 'period of rest.' (4) Pay Order hundis were used as receipts given in lieu of dowry payments made during a marriage ceremony. They were drawn against special compound interest-bearing thavanai accounts known as accimar panam accounts (see below) .18 Available information about dharsan and nadappu hundis is generally confusing and inconsistent.19 For example, although most 6l Many merchants extended their business relationship with Chettiar bankers beyond purely financial transactions. For example, most Burmese and many small-scale Chettiar merchants had no storage go-downs of their own. In such cases, merchants frequently stored and insured their paddy in a go-down conveniently owned by the bankers. Ultimately they might even sell the paddy to the bankers.
17 In practice, I am told, Chettiar bankers were normally liberal in converting thavanai hundis into dharsan hundis if their clients were faced with an unexpected cash flow problem. At the same time, the Burmese banking analyst, Tun Wai, observes that thavanai deposits technically cashable by hundis after as short a term as two months often remained with the bank of deposit 'for decades' (I962: 45). 18 Pay order hundis are not mentioned in any published description of Chettiar banking practices, but Chettiar banker and writer, Somalay, informs me that they used this English phrase in reference to hundis drawn as dowry payments.
19 At least to the financially unsophisticated reader. Indeed an earlier version of this merchant's account. If the banker had no office in Rangoon he sent the hundi and receipt to another banker (perhaps, but not necessarily an adathi) with whom he maintained an account. The first banker could thus rediscount the hundi with the second banker who normally extended the service without charging a further discounting fee. In order to regain the railway receipt and take possession of his paddy from either banker, the merchant had to maintain a deposit account with the Rangoon banker in a satisfactory manner.16 Chettiars made use of four basic hundis:
(I) Dharsan hundis or demand drafts (literally, 'sight' hundis) were payable against a kadai kanakku account within a three-day grace period of presentation to a person and at a place specified in the hundi.
(2) Nadappu hundis (literally, 'walking' hundis), were also payable against a kadai kanakku account. Nadappu hundis were instruments unique to Chettiars and were neither demand drafts nor fixed period, term drafts but, instead, were discounted at the convenience of the drawee, whose only obligation was to pay interest at the nadappu rate until he chose to encash them.
The banks (the drawees) need not pay on demand until after the specified date, usually 60 to 90 days after the bill was drawn. 19 At least to the financially unsophisticated reader. Indeed an earlier version of this merchant's account. If the banker had no office in Rangoon he sent the hundi and receipt to another banker (perhaps, but not necessarily an adathi) with whom he maintained an account. The first banker could thus rediscount the hundi with the second banker who normally extended the service without charging a further discounting fee. In order to regain the railway receipt and take possession of his paddy from either banker, the merchant had to maintain a deposit account with the Rangoon banker in a satisfactory manner.16 Chettiars made use of four basic hundis:
The banks (the drawees) need not pay on demand until after the specified date, usually 60 to 90 days after the bill was drawn. Hundis were not regulated under colonial laws concerning negotiable instruments and were distinguished from 'true' bills of exchange on the ground that their terms for encashment were not unconditionally paper (I985) presented a description of Chettiar hundis that erroneously classed dharsan and nadappu hundis in a single category. 20 For discussion of the institutional sanctions operating to minimize conflict and resolve disputes, see Rudner I985.
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authorities suggest that all Chettiar demand drafts paid interest a nadappu rate, examination of sample hundis (see Appendix) r duced in the Report of the Madras Provincial Banking En Committee reveals a sub-set of dharsan hundis that paid no int In fact, this inconsistency is less problematic than the suggestion both hundis paid identical interest at the nadappu rate. If it w case that no dharsan hundi paid interest, people would have dharsan hundis if they wanted to transfer capital and were willin pay a discount fee for the service. They would have drawn na hundis if they had no expectation of any cash flow crisis, if they their nadappu deposits as safe interest-bearing deposits, and if th no worries about their banker's ultimate ability and willingness t the hundi. The fact is, however, that some dharsan hundis d interest. Their availability creates a puzzle because the liquid dharsan hundis would have eliminated any incentive to draw n hundis with an identical yield but with uncertain conditio encashment. One possible solution is that Chettiar bankers ma had sufficient control over mechanisms for transferring fun withhold dharsan hundis from clients and, instead, offered na hundis as the only available option. Another and even more solution is that the drawing of hundis was quite a flexible matter hinged on the specific situation of drawer and drawee. This account for inconsistency on the part of analysts attemptin construct a uniform model of Chettiar hundis.
The kind of flexibility that seems to be suggested by the evidence of hundis themselves raises a another problem, however, because Chettiar bankers also offered clients facilities for drawing 60 to 90 day thavanai deposits. It is not clear why anyone should wish to deposit his money at the lower nadappu rate of interest unless he was assured of definite repayment more quickly than the terms to maturity offered by thavanai hundis. We can only assume that the actual performance of Chettiar bankers confirmed their financial trustworthiness and ability to meet most demands for repayment without causing unacceptable cost or delay.20 Hundis were not regulated under colonial laws concerning negotiable instruments and were distinguished from 'true' bills of exchange on the ground that their terms for encashment were not unconditionally paper (I985) presented a description of Chettiar hundis that erroneously classed dharsan and nadappu hundis in a single category. 20 For discussion of the institutional sanctions operating to minimize conflict and resolve disputes, see Rudner I985.
The kind of flexibility that seems to be suggested by the evidence of hundis themselves raises a another problem, however, because Chettiar bankers also offered clients facilities for drawing 60 to 90 day thavanai deposits. It is not clear why anyone should wish to deposit his money at the lower nadappu rate of interest unless he was assured of definite repayment more quickly than the terms to maturity offered by thavanai hundis. We can only assume that the actual performance of Chettiar bankers confirmed their financial trustworthiness and ability to meet most demands for repayment without causing unacceptable cost or delay.20 Hundis were not regulated under colonial laws concerning negotiable instruments and were distinguished from 'true' bills of exchange on the ground that their terms for encashment were not unconditionally paper (I985) presented a description of Chettiar hundis that erroneously classed dharsan and nadappu hundis in a single category. specified. In general, they specified two cond indicated the particular fund which the draw particular account which was to be debited they included a statement of the transaction In addition, nadappu hundis specified no encashment whatsoever. Because of the because of the absence of stipulations abou nadappu hundis, all Chettiar hundis fell o Negotiable Instruments Act, and hence w (MPBEC I930 I: 5I-2; PBBEC I930: 150, ci K. V. Krishnan I959: 53).
Despite this, it is important not to invest t non-negotiable with more significance than i that view coincides with an unclear understa and procedures under which hundis were Chettiar hundis had no standing in a court made collective decisions about interest rates that standardized the cost of credit. In addition, their own communal tribunals (panchayats) and their practice of maintaining custody of railway and shipping receipts on trade hundis provided a check on dishonest practices. In other words, together with careful accounting procedures (see below) and a practice of systematic correspondence among cooperating bankers, the various collective, Chettiar institutions effectively regulated transactions, and minimized the risk of default to a remarkable extent. Indeed, one banking expert whose personal knowledge of the system allowed him to keep the law in perspective notes: 'In the case of 136 firms doing business in Chettinad to the extent of I I crores of rupees [Rs I 0, 000 ,00] the bad debts come to only Rs 4.3 lakhs [Rs 430 ,000] which works out to 1/2% on the total volume of business.' (Krishnan 1959:41 ) .
Accounting
The clearest evidence for reconstructing Chettiar financial activities during the colonial period is contained in account books and ledgers maintained during the heyday of their Southeast Asian commercial empire. In many cases, these books may presently be found mouldering and ant-eaten in dusty corners of the great houses of Chettinad, the Chettiar homeland in Tamil Nadu. The detailed record that they leave of commercial activities throughout South India and Southeast Asia represents a still untapped resource for historians. But it is one that is specified. In general, they specified two conditions of payment: (I) they indicated the particular fund which the drawer was to reimburse or a particular account which was to be debited with the amount and (2) they included a statement of the transaction which gave rise to the bill.
In addition, nadappu hundis specified no obligatory conditions for encashment whatsoever. Because of the former stipulations and because of the absence of stipulations about payment in the case of nadappu hundis, all Chettiar hundis fell outside the scope of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and hence were legally unenforceable (MPBEC I930 I: 5I-2; PBBEC I930: 150, cited in Tun Wai I962: 50; K. V. Krishnan I959: 53).
Despite this, it is important not to invest the legal view of hundis as non-negotiable with more significance than it deserves, especially when that view coincides with an unclear understanding about the sanctions and procedures under which hundis were actually drawn. Although Chettiar hundis had no standing in a court of law, Chettiar bankers made collective decisions about interest rates that standardized the cost of credit. In addition, their own communal tribunals (panchayats) and their practice of maintaining custody of railway and shipping receipts on trade hundis provided a check on dishonest practices. In other words, together with careful accounting procedures (see below) and a practice of systematic correspondence among cooperating bankers, the various collective, Chettiar institutions effectively regulated transactions, and minimized the risk of default to a remarkable extent. Indeed, one banking expert whose personal knowledge of the system allowed him to keep the law in perspective notes: 'In the case of 136 firms doing business in Chettinad to the extent of I I crores of rupees [Rs I 0, 000 ,00] the bad debts come to only Rs 4.3 lakhs [Rs 430 ,000] which works out to 1/2% on the total volume of business.' (Krishnan 1959:41 ) .
The clearest evidence for reconstructing Chettiar financial activities during the colonial period is contained in account books and ledgers maintained during the heyday of their Southeast Asian commercial empire. In many cases, these books may presently be found mouldering and ant-eaten in dusty corners of the great houses of Chettinad, the Chettiar homeland in Tamil Nadu. The detailed record that they leave of commercial activities throughout South India and Southeast Asia represents a still untapped resource for historians. But it is one that is rapidly vanishing and merits attention before the opportuni irrevocably lost. In any case, I gained access only to a set of a books for the years 1912-15 and 1918-21 from a single large agency operated in Burma. Given the lack of any sufficiently continuous r account books, I refer to this set primarily to describe Chet accounting categories and the sources of capital available to a Chet agency. I do not use them to characterize the specific financial ro this firm (let alone of Chettiars taken collectively) in the cont Burmese and Chettiar commercial history. In general, the function ofChettiar books was to provide a picture of an agency's relationship with each of its clients, with separate listings of expenses and revenues. This function served the interests of both the agent and his client. Entries were carefully made on the occasion of any financial transaction, rather like a pass book in an American savings bank. In some cases, they were even initialed by the client. In any case, the information these ledgers contained could, in principle, have been pulled together into a general ledger and a balance sheet. But they were not. In Table I I Chettiar books were not confined to the various component ledgers constituting a peredu. They also included apekkipustakam, a subsidiary book containing figures for outstanding dues, debts, and deposits. No record of payments or receipts was maintained in the pekki pustakam.
22 Without a general ledger, Chettiar account books do not seem to provide a picture of the overall profitability of an agency. This seems peculiar. And it is possible that the books which I examined did not represent a complete set. In this regard, I note that Somalay, a Chettiar writer and a retired banker, makes ambiguous references to ledgers called ainthugais in rough manuscripts for an unpublished book. In one instance, he uses the term to describe the duplicate ledger sheets sent by an agent to his proprietor and copied by the proprietor's son. This reference is similar to periodically mailed balance sheets by the same name mentioned by Krishnan 1959: 34. In In general, the function ofChettiar books was to provide a picture of an agency's relationship with each of its clients, with separate listings of expenses and revenues. This function served the interests of both the agent and his client. Entries were carefully made on the occasion of any financial transaction, rather like a pass book in an American savings bank. In some cases, they were even initialed by the client. In any case, the information these ledgers contained could, in principle, have been pulled together into a general ledger and a balance sheet. But they were not. In Table I I Chettiar books were not confined to the various component ledgers constituting a peredu. They also included apekkipustakam, a subsidiary book containing figures for outstanding dues, debts, and deposits. No record of payments or receipts was maintained in the pekki pustakam.
22 Without a general ledger, Chettiar account books do not seem to provide a picture of the overall profitability of an agency. This seems peculiar. And it is possible that the books which I examined did not represent a complete set. In this regard, I note that Somalay, a Chettiar writer and a retired banker, makes ambiguous references to ledgers called ainthugais in rough manuscripts for an unpublished book. In one instance, he uses the term to describe the duplicate ledger sheets sent by an agent to his proprietor and copied by the proprietor's son. This reference is similar to periodically mailed balance sheets by the same name mentioned by Krishnan 1959: 34. In another instance, Somalay presents an explicit definition, translating ainthugai as 'balance sheet' and stipulating that 'This contained five items-capital, borrowings, investments, other outstandings, and profits.' I note that this statement contains no evidence for the use of a double entry system. Nor does Krishnan's description of indigenous accounting methods alter my belief that double entry systems were not used.
23 I am deeply indebted to Rachel Winslow CPA who helped me to prepare the general ledger and balance sheet from figures translated from the agency's peredu.
point about which there is some confusion it is worth emphasizing that a peredu's debit and credit entries seem to represent clearly separate transactions and frequently showed a net difference between credits and debits. Nevertheless, its correlation of income and expenses incurred by an account may be what my informant meant by double-entry book-keeping. It is also the case that each column of figures recorded in the peredu maintained a running total and provided a final net balance for each year. But I could locate no general ledger summarizing all of the various transactions, nor any overall balance sheet. In other words, a peredu lacked the defined characteristics of a Western-style general ledger.22
In general, the function ofChettiar books was to provide a picture of an agency's relationship with each of its clients, with separate listings of expenses and revenues. This function served the interests of both the agent and his client. Entries were carefully made on the occasion of any financial transaction, rather like a pass book in an American savings bank. In some cases, they were even initialed by the client. In any case, the information these ledgers contained could, in principle, have been pulled together into a general ledger and a balance sheet. But they were not. In Table I I Chettiar books were not confined to the various component ledgers constituting a peredu. They also included apekkipustakam, a subsidiary book containing figures for outstanding dues, debts, and deposits. No record of payments or receipts was maintained in the pekki pustakam.
23 I am deeply indebted to Rachel Winslow CPA who helped me to prepare the general ledger and balance sheet from figures translated from the agency's peredu. 
I6. Other current accounts (demand deposits). no totals
., .
Ho pr de co pa co an en co recover any Tamil name for this book. It consisted of carbon tracings-'press copies'-of all correspondence.24 Taken together, the information contained in these Chettiar books of account and correspondence cast considerable light on the role of this particular agency at this specific period in history. But, as already indicated, the present paper confines itselfjust to a structural analysis of the agency's relationship with its various depositors, especially as these are captured However, a separate book of vatti chitti (interest calculation sheets) did provide records of interest payments for clients who maintained deposits with the agency. A daily cash book (kurippu) kept track of the complicated transactions that went on every day. The amounts listed as paid or received in the kurippu may also have been recorded in the last component ledger of the peredu. But, because these final entries lack any description of the content of transactions they record, I am not entirely confident about this interpretation. Finally, copies of all correspondence were maintained in a press copy book. I was unable to recover any Tamil name for this book. It consisted of carbon tracings-'press copies'-of all correspondence.24 Taken together, the information contained in these Chettiar books of account and correspondence cast considerable light on the role of this particular agency at this specific period in history. But, as already indicated, the present paper confines itselfjust to a structural analysis of the agency's relationship with its various depositors, especially as these are captured However, a separate book of vatti chitti (interest calculation sheets) did provide records of interest payments for clients who maintained deposits with the agency. A daily cash book (kurippu) kept track of the complicated transactions that went on every day. The amounts listed as paid or received in the kurippu may also have been recorded in the last component ledger of the peredu. But, because these final entries lack any description of the content of transactions they record, I am not entirely confident about this interpretation. Finally, copies of all correspondence were maintained in a press copy book. I was unable to recover any Tamil name for this book. It consisted of carbon tracings-'press copies'-of all correspondence.24 Taken together, the information contained in these Chettiar books of account and correspondence cast considerable light on the role of this particular agency at this specific period in history. But, as already indicated, the present paper confines itselfjust to a structural analysis of the agency's relationship with its various depositors, especially as these are captured Table 2 ).
a Chettiar agency in Rangoon, 1915-19 (f account titles, see Table 2 ).
a Chettiar agency in Rangoon, 1915-19 (f account titles, see Table 2 ). Based on this and similar kinds of testimony about the distribution of Chettiar assets, authorities such as Pillai (MPBEC 1930 I: i86) Examination of the balance sheet for 1929 (Table 2) confirms the highly liquid quality ofChettiar assets prior to the depression described earlier in this essay. Tun Wai estimates that Ioo% of Chettiar assets were in cash, hundis or loans. By contrast, the I935 balance sheet (Table 3) indicates the impact of the depression on the liquidity of these assets. My informants all confirm Tun Wai's interpretation of mudal panam as confined in its application just to proprietor's capital. But none of them employed the single contrasting category of sontha thavanai panam. Instead, my Chettiar informants offered a variety of terms segmenting the domain of relatives and kinship. It is likely that sontha thavanai panam was an umbrella term for deposits from any kinsman (Tm: contakkarar). Bankers whom I consulted, however, did not use this term at all, but rather the term mempanam ('surplus funds') as an even more embracing umbrella category to refer to any deposit besides the proprietor's own mudal panam. This included deposits by relatives such as accimar panam (dowry deposits from in-laws) and If we isolate entries for the mempanam deposits in the peredu available to me (corresponding to its items I, 7, 13, and 14) and compare them with entries credited to the proprietor's headquarters' account (item 2), the lesson is startling. In this agency, at least, mutal panam-the proprietor's own capital-did not constitute 65% to 85% of its sources of funds, as it would have if there was a direct correspondence between, on one hand, the proportion of aggregate Chettiar-owned funds to all Chettiar working capital in Burma and, on the other hand, the proportion of an individual proprietor's own capital contribution to the working capital of his agency house. Instead, the proprietor's funds in this specific agency were barely I2.5% the amount 26 Although the mempanam sub-categories identified were gleaned from analyzing the Burmese agency's account books described above, only minor and obvious modifications are required to adjust for differences in funding sources available to Chettiars in Malaya, Ceylon, Singapore, or Madras, for that matter. dowry deposits from any other Chettiar outside thejoint family (valavu) that owned the firm. In addition, mempanam also included deposits from non-kin Chettiars and from non-Chettiars. The different subcategories of mempanam funds are identified in Table 4.26   TABLE 4 Chettiar Classification of Liabilities (Burmese example).
I. Principal's personal funds (mutal panam) 2. All other funds (mempanam). If we isolate entries for the mempanam deposits in the peredu available to me (corresponding to its items I, 7, 13, and 14) and compare them with entries credited to the proprietor's headquarters' account (item 2), the lesson is startling. In this agency, at least, mutal panam-the proprietor's own capital-did not constitute 65% to 85% of its sources of funds, as it would have if there was a direct correspondence between, on one hand, the proportion of aggregate Chettiar-owned funds to all Chettiar working capital in Burma and, on the other hand, the proportion of an individual proprietor's own capital contribution to the working capital of his agency house. Instead, the proprietor's funds in this specific agency were barely I2.5% the amount 26 Although the mempanam sub-categories identified were gleaned from analyzing the Burmese agency's account books described above, only minor and obvious modifications are required to adjust for differences in funding sources available to Chettiars in Malaya, Ceylon, Singapore, or Madras, for that matter. dowry deposits from any other Chettiar outside thejoint family (valavu) that owned the firm. In addition, mempanam also included deposits from non-kin Chettiars and from non-Chettiars. The different subcategories of mempanam funds are identified in Table 4.26   TABLE 4 Chettiar Classification of Liabilities (Burmese example).
I. Principal's personal funds (mutal panam) 2. All other funds (mempanam). If we isolate entries for the mempanam deposits in the peredu available to me (corresponding to its items I, 7, 13, and 14) and compare them with entries credited to the proprietor's headquarters' account (item 2), the lesson is startling. In this agency, at least, mutal panam-the proprietor's own capital-did not constitute 65% to 85% of its sources of funds, as it would have if there was a direct correspondence between, on one hand, the proportion of aggregate Chettiar-owned funds to all Chettiar working capital in Burma and, on the other hand, the proportion of an individual proprietor's own capital contribution to the working capital of his agency house. Instead, the proprietor's funds in this specific agency were barely I2.5% the amount 26 Although the mempanam sub-categories identified were gleaned from analyzing the Burmese agency's account books described above, only minor and obvious modifications are required to adjust for differences in funding sources available to Chettiars in Malaya, Ceylon, Singapore, or Madras, for that matter.
of funds deposited by his relatives and other Chettiar bank Chettiar-controlled institutions such as the temple accounts li the peredu as items 13 and I4. This difference between aggreg individual accounting may seem obvious, although it has been a so of confusion for at least some scholars working on the topic.
To summarize, Chettiar proprietors generally contributed I 20% of the working capital of their agency offices in the f long-term thavanai deposits. These were frequently repaid t proprietor during the course of his agent's three-year contra sequence of regular remittances. Conventions for financial transa between a banking agency and its other clients also depen maintenance of deposit accounts with the agency. According t Krishnan (I959: 125) , and here we are speaking of deposits m individual banking agencies, non-Chettiar deposits made up, at another 20% of an agency's working capital. In other words, into account the proprietor's own deposits (mutal panam) and kinds of non-Chettiar deposits, it is possible to estimate the prop of working capital contributed by deposits from other Chettiar fi between 60% and 80% of all deposits. Again, this is supported by from the Burmese agency analyzed above.
One final feature of Chettiar financial transactions should also be remarked in connection with the distinction between Chettiar and non-Chettiar clients. In the case of their non-Chettiar clients, transactions were always recorded on a cash basis; that is, only actua cash receipts and disbursements were entered in a firm's ledger. By contrast, transactions between Chettiars (including the proprietor and his agency) were recorded on a mercantile or accrual basis; that is, they credited each other with the appropriate amount of interest due and exchanged vatti chitti sheets (memoranda of interest calculations). The accounts they held with each other were normally reconciled only at three-year intervals, coinciding with the termination of a Chettiar agent's tenure as head of a banking agency.
The Culture of Chettiar Banking
From a cultural perspective, Chettiar banking activities represented set of symbolic transactions. Exchanges of financial instruments were made between proprietors and agents, bankers and borrowers, bankers and bankers, bankers and governments, or bankers and religious or charitable endowments. In all cases, parties to a transaction arrived a NATTUKOTTAI CHETTIARS OF COLONIAL SOUTH INDIA 447 of funds deposited by his relatives and other Chettiar bank Chettiar-controlled institutions such as the temple accounts li the peredu as items 13 and I4. This difference between aggreg individual accounting may seem obvious, although it has been a so of confusion for at least some scholars working on the topic.
From a cultural perspective, Chettiar banking activities represented set of symbolic transactions. Exchanges of financial instruments were made between proprietors and agents, bankers and borrowers, bankers and bankers, bankers and governments, or bankers and religious or charitable endowments. In all cases, parties to a transaction arrived a a common understanding about the pri instruments, and about the reliability of th banker to re-extend credit.
In contrast to other items of exchange-food, land, or women, for example-Chettiar financial instruments (including those employed for inter-Chettiar deposits) were remarkable for their context-free liquidity and negotiability. They were, in terms, things which had a 'subtle substance-code' among the universe of things exchanged by actors in Hindu society.27 This subtlety-in Marriott's sense-was clearly reflected in their negotiability. Chettiar financial instruments did not conduct pollution. Actors of different ritual status who exchanged financial instruments were not at risk as they would have been if they had exchanged such things as cooked food, garbage, or feces. Financial instruments, therefore, had a negotiability throughout society that permitted their exchange between people whose ritual status was known to be unequal and (in long-distance, indirect, or multiple-party transactions) between people whose ritual status was unknown. Beyond this, Chettiar financial instruments were often saleable, the larger Chettiar firms acting as clearing houses for instruments drawn up by smaller firms. Finally, although in many cases, loans were refinanced or deposits maintained indefinitely, transactions of specific Chettiar instruments were either automatically terminated after a fixed period of time or were terminable on demand. A transaction involving Chettiar financial instruments was therefore, in principle, free from any of those enduring obligations that mark gift-giving relationships of generalized reciprocity ). The social relationship symbolized by a financial transaction was, to adapt terminology, 'minimized.' In fact, Chettiar financial instruments constituted a type of commodity, circulating freely in 27 'The media of Hindu transactions are substance-codes that may be scaled from the relatively "gross" (sthula) to the relatively "subtle" (suksma). "Gross"-that is, lower, less refined, more tangible, and less widely transformable substance-codes-are contrasted with higher, less tangible, substance-codes that are 'subtler,' more capable of transformation, and therefore imbued with greater power and value. For example, knowledge may be considered subtler than money, and money subtler than grain or land, but grain or land not so gross as cooked food or garbarge, which have less power of generation. Such a scale may be understood as resembling the distinctions among communications codes capable of generating more and fewer messages; but Indian thought understands subtler substance-codes as emerging through processes of maturation or (what is considered to be the same thing) cooking. Thus subtler essences may sometimes be ripened, extracted, or distilled out of grosser ones (as fruit comes. from plants, nectar from flowers, butter from milk); and grosser substance-codes may be generated or precipitated out of subtler ones (as plants come from seed, feces from food).' (Marriott 1976: iio.) a common understanding about the price and term of financial instruments, and about the reliability of the borrower to repay and the banker to re-extend credit.
In contrast to other items of exchange-food, land, or women, for example-Chettiar financial instruments (including those employed for inter-Chettiar deposits) were remarkable for their context-free liquidity and negotiability. They were, in terms, things which had a 'subtle substance-code' among the universe of things exchanged by actors in Hindu society.27 This subtlety-in Marriott's sense-was clearly reflected in their negotiability. Chettiar financial instruments did not conduct pollution. Actors of different ritual status who exchanged financial instruments were not at risk as they would have been if they had exchanged such things as cooked food, garbage, or feces. Financial instruments, therefore, had a negotiability throughout society that permitted their exchange between people whose ritual status was known to be unequal and (in long-distance, indirect, or multiple-party transactions) between people whose ritual status was unknown. Beyond this, Chettiar financial instruments were often saleable, the larger Chettiar firms acting as clearing houses for instruments drawn up by smaller firms. Finally, although in many cases, loans were refinanced or deposits maintained indefinitely, transactions of specific Chettiar instruments were either automatically terminated after a fixed period of time or were terminable on demand. A transaction involving Chettiar financial instruments was therefore, in principle, free from any of those enduring obligations that mark gift-giving relationships of generalized reciprocity ). The social relationship symbolized by a financial transaction was, to adapt terminology, 'minimized.' In fact, Chettiar financial instruments constituted a type of commodity, circulating freely in 27 'The media of Hindu transactions are substance-codes that may be scaled from the relatively "gross" (sthula) to the relatively "subtle" (suksma). "Gross"-that is, lower, less refined, more tangible, and less widely transformable substance-codes-are contrasted with higher, less tangible, substance-codes that are 'subtler,' more capable of transformation, and therefore imbued with greater power and value. For example, knowledge may be considered subtler than money, and money subtler than grain or land, but grain or land not so gross as cooked food or garbarge, which have less power of generation. Such a scale may be understood as resembling the distinctions among communications codes capable of generating more and fewer messages; but Indian thought understands subtler substance-codes as emerging through processes of maturation or (what is considered to be the same thing) cooking. Thus subtler essences may sometimes be ripened, extracted, or distilled out of grosser ones (as fruit comes. from plants, nectar from flowers, butter from milk); and grosser substance-codes may be generated or precipitated out of subtler ones (as plants come from seed, feces from food).' (Marriott 1976: iio.) by considerations of price (Kopytoff I986).
In one crucial respect, however, Chettiar financial instrume distinct from commodities in the idealized, market-oriented se word briefly sketched here. Although exhibiting a discrete v left their transactors free from the obligations of generalize ity, they did establish temporary bonds of trust and mutual e between transactors. Moreover, different kinds of instrumen ized different bonds, for different periods, and were secured b sanctions. In other words, although financial instruments as objects were, in Marriott's terms, all constituted of subtle su the Hindu universe of exchange, within this subtle class ther various subtly distinguished sub-classes. This is particularly apparent in the different kinds of established by inter-bank transactions between Chetti deposits included kadai kanakku deposits that functioned like accounts and could be drawn on by dharsan or nadappu hu also included thavanai deposits on which they could draw hundis, payable after a short period of rest. Finally, established various long-term, ritually-generated deposits relatives, for lineage mates, clan mates and for Chettiartemples and public institutions of various kinds. In othe transactions of Chettiar financial instruments that established kinds of deposits with different terms to maturity also e distinct spheres of exchange among Chettiar firms related by of caste-based principles for social cooperation.
The capital structure of individual firms reveals the ex caste-based, mutual risk-taking by the number and size of deposits. And the disposition to take risks over the long term, me, corresponds very closely to our notion of 'trust,' wha refer to in Tamil In one crucial respect, however, Chettiar financial instrume distinct from commodities in the idealized, market-oriented se word briefly sketched here. Although exhibiting a discrete v left their transactors free from the obligations of generalize ity, they did establish temporary bonds of trust and mutual e between transactors. Moreover, different kinds of instrumen ized different bonds, for different periods, and were secured b sanctions. In other words, although financial instruments as objects were, in Marriott's terms, all constituted of subtle su the Hindu universe of exchange, within this subtle class ther various subtly distinguished sub-classes. This is particularly apparent in the different kinds of established by inter-bank transactions between Chetti deposits included kadai kanakku deposits that functioned like accounts and could be drawn on by dharsan or nadappu hu also included thavanai deposits on which they could draw hundis, payable after a short period of rest. Finally, established various long-term, ritually-generated deposits relatives, for lineage mates, clan mates and for Chettiartemples and public institutions of various kinds. In othe transactions of Chettiar financial instruments that established kinds of deposits with different terms to maturity also e distinct spheres of exchange among Chettiar firms related by of caste-based principles for social cooperation.
The capital structure of individual firms reveals the ex caste-based, mutual risk-taking by the number and size of deposits. And the disposition to take risks over the long term, me, corresponds very closely to our notion of 'trust,' wha refer to in Tamil as nanayam. It emerges in Chettiar account continuous cultural variable that distinguishes a range of and short-term social relationships, exploding the over-sim tomy between gifts of open-ended, generalized exchange a commodities restricted to a momentary, one-time-only tra
The spheres of exchange that entailed the most trust and t defined by ritually-based, long-term deposits are especially in in the present context because they included transactions functionally equivalent to investments in long-term certi deposit issued by Western banks. And, like long-term cert deposit in Western banks, the funds they represented wer In one crucial respect, however, Chettiar financial instrume distinct from commodities in the idealized, market-oriented se word briefly sketched here. Although exhibiting a discrete v left their transactors free from the obligations of generalize ity, they did establish temporary bonds of trust and mutual e between transactors. Moreover, different kinds of instrumen ized different bonds, for different periods, and were secured b sanctions. In other words, although financial instruments as objects were, in Marriott's terms, all constituted of subtle su the Hindu universe of exchange, within this subtle class ther various subtly distinguished sub-classes. This is particularly apparent in the different kinds of established by inter-bank transactions between Chetti deposits included kadai kanakku deposits that functioned like accounts and could be drawn on by dharsan or nadappu hu also included thavanai deposits on which they could draw hundis, payable after a short period of rest. Finally, established various long-term, ritually-generated deposits relatives, for lineage mates, clan mates and for Chettiartemples and public institutions of various kinds. In othe transactions of Chettiar financial instruments that established kinds of deposits with different terms to maturity also e distinct spheres of exchange among Chettiar firms related by of caste-based principles for social cooperation.
The spheres of exchange that entailed the most trust and t defined by ritually-based, long-term deposits are especially in in the present context because they included transactions functionally equivalent to investments in long-term certi deposit issued by Western banks. And, like long-term cert deposit in Western banks, the funds they represented wer sitting idly in the recipient firm's coffers. They were lent out. The firm then received interest. The borrower had capital he could invest or otherwise spend. At the same time, the original deposit still stood to the credit of the original long-term depositor, earning him interest and providing him security against which to obtain loans for further investment and expenditure. By conducting financial transactions within different spheres of exchange, individual firms were able to control their cash flow and to insure that original depositors and subsequent borrowers did not claim their deposits at the same time. In this way every deposit to a Chettiar bank could and did serve as the basis for expanding the supply of money and credit for the system as a whole. That is, Chettiar financial transactions generated what Western economists refer to as a 'multiplier effect.' The capital thereby created (along with profits and interest generated by other banking and trading operations) was expended on a wealth of items for consumption, exchange, and further investment. To put it simply, financial transactions among different Chettiar spheres of exchange created wealth. In Marriott's terms, multi-sphere transactions were made possible by the subtle medium of Chettiar financial instruments and generated an increase in both the supply of money and in the production of things with substance-codes of grosser quality such as land, minerals or agrarian commodities. Chettiar financial instruments were, indeed, not only highly liquid, negotiable, and transformable, they were also richly productive and generative.
The extent of Chettiar money creation is not clear. I have not ascertained the normal reserve ratio maintained by Chettiar bankers. The ease and reliability of inter-firm loans reported by retired bankers suggest and the practices brought to light by court records confirm that it was a remarkably high ratio. In any case, it seems clear that the tremendous growth of Chettiar assets in Southeast Asia cannot be entirely attributed (as it is sometimes suggested) either to a transfer of funds from India or to a diversion of profits from the agricultural and mining industries of Southest Asia. This is not to say that the Chettiar banking system resembled an economist's model of Western-style banking systems. It bears repeating that Chettiars loaned and deposited money with one another in caste-defined social relationships based on business territory, residential location, descent, marriage, and common cult membership. Unlike modern Western banking systems, it was the reputation, decisions and reserve deposits shared among exchange spheres defined according to sitting idly in the recipient firm's coffers. They were lent out. The firm then received interest. The borrower had capital he could invest or otherwise spend. At the same time, the original deposit still stood to the credit of the original long-term depositor, earning him interest and providing him security against which to obtain loans for further investment and expenditure.
By conducting financial transactions within different spheres of exchange, individual firms were able to control their cash flow and to insure that original depositors and subsequent borrowers did not claim their deposits at the same time. In this way every deposit to a Chettiar bank could and did serve as the basis for expanding the supply of money and credit for the system as a whole. That is, Chettiar financial transactions generated what Western economists refer to as a 'multiplier effect.' The capital thereby created (along with profits and interest generated by other banking and trading operations) was expended on a wealth of items for consumption, exchange, and further investment. To put it simply, financial transactions among different Chettiar spheres of exchange created wealth. In Marriott's terms, multi-sphere transactions were made possible by the subtle medium of Chettiar financial instruments and generated an increase in both the supply of money and in the production of things with substance-codes of grosser quality such as land, minerals or agrarian commodities. Chettiar financial instruments were, indeed, not only highly liquid, negotiable, and transformable, they were also richly productive and generative.
The extent of Chettiar money creation is not clear. I have not ascertained the normal reserve ratio maintained by Chettiar bankers. The ease and reliability of inter-firm loans reported by retired bankers suggest and the practices brought to light by court records confirm that it was a remarkably high ratio. In any case, it seems clear that the tremendous growth of Chettiar assets in Southeast Asia cannot be entirely attributed (as it is sometimes suggested) either to a transfer of funds from India or to a diversion of profits from the agricultural and mining industries of Southest Asia. This is not to say that the Chettiar banking system resembled an economist's model of Western-style banking systems. It bears repeating that Chettiars loaned and deposited money with one another in caste-defined social relationships based on business territory, residential location, descent, marriage, and common cult membership. Unlike modern Western banking systems, it was the reputation, decisions and reserve deposits shared among exchange spheres defined according to these principles, and not a government-controlled central b played a dominant role in the regulation of reserve levels and public confidence in individual Chettiars as representatives of as a whole.
In other words, the Chettiar banking system was a caste-based banking system. Individual Chettiars organized their lives around the participation and management of various communal institutions adapted to the task of accumulating and distributing reserves of capital.
If I can appropriate a metaphor from space-age laser weaponry, the Chettiar system of interdepositing banks and reserve-accumulating institutions operated like a system of mirrors and lenses, accumulating capital and focusing it on economy-heating terminal lenses corresponding to the moneylending agents for Chettiar banking firms. In sum, the specific Chettiar construction of negotiable financial instruments and distinct but inter-linked spheres of exchange defined a banking system different in detail from the 'rationalized' systems of the West, but well adapted to take advantage of opportunities for international trade and finance in the colonial society of South and Southeast Asia. In other words, the Chettiar banking system was a caste-based banking system. Individual Chettiars organized their lives around the participation and management of various communal institutions adapted to the task of accumulating and distributing reserves of capital.
If I can appropriate a metaphor from space-age laser weaponry, the Chettiar system of interdepositing banks and reserve-accumulating institutions operated like a system of mirrors and lenses, accumulating capital and focusing it on economy-heating terminal lenses corresponding to the moneylending agents for Chettiar banking firms. In sum, the specific Chettiar construction of negotiable financial instruments and distinct but inter-linked spheres of exchange defined a banking system different in detail from the 'rationalized' systems of the West, but well adapted to take advantage of opportunities for international trade and finance in the colonial society of South and Southeast Asia. Appendix A.
Determining the prevailing interest rates for nadappu and thavanai deposits should be quite straight-forward, as they were published on a regular basis by various Chettiar journals throughout Madras and Southeast Asia, and also in the reports of the different Banking Enquiry Committees of 1930. In the latter, however, thavanai rates-which should have paid the higher rate of interest-are listed at lower levels than nadappu rates. I am unable to explain this anomaly. I note that it is not only at odds with what surviving Chettiars report about their practices (not to mention common sense), but it is even at odds with the descriptions given by banking authorities in the discursive parts of the report for which the tables were prepared. I reproduce some of these questionable figures below. Determining the prevailing interest rates for nadappu and thavanai deposits should be quite straight-forward, as they were published on a regular basis by various Chettiar journals throughout Madras and Southeast Asia, and also in the reports of the different Banking Enquiry Committees of 1930. In the latter, however, thavanai rates-which should have paid the higher rate of interest-are listed at lower levels than nadappu rates. I am unable to explain this anomaly. I note that it is not only at odds with what surviving Chettiars report about their practices (not to mention common sense), but it is even at odds with the descriptions given by banking authorities in the discursive parts of the report for which the tables were prepared. I reproduce some of these questionable figures below. Determining the prevailing interest rates for nadappu and thavanai deposits should be quite straight-forward, as they were published on a regular basis by various Chettiar journals throughout Madras and Southeast Asia, and also in the reports of the different Banking Enquiry Committees of 1930. In the latter, however, thavanai rates-which should have paid the higher rate of interest-are listed at lower levels than nadappu rates. I am unable to explain this anomaly. I note that it is not only at odds with what surviving Chettiars report about their practices (not to mention common sense), but it is even at odds with the descriptions given by banking authorities in the discursive parts of the report for which the tables were prepared. I reproduce some of these questionable figures below. 
